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2007]
EAGLE ENVIRONMENTAL II, L.P. v. COMMONWEALTH:
THE HARMS/BENEFITS TEST AND APPEALING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL HEARING BOARD - WHO
DECIDES THE STANDARD OF REVIEW?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Pennsylvania Legislature created the Environmental Hear-
ing Board (EHB) in the 1970s as part of the Department of Envi-
ronmental Resources.' The EHB provides a forum for citizens to
challenge actions of the Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP).2 Originally, the DEP was split into two branches: one legis-
lative, the Environmental Quality Board (EQB), and the other judi-
cial, the EHB. 3 Subsequently, in 1988 the Environmental Hearing
Board Act separated the EHB from the DEP.4 The EHB now exists
as a separate entity from the DEP and functions as a statutorily es-
tablished trial court that only hears environmental cases. 5
This Note will take an initial look at the EHB and the standard
of review that the EHB, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court employ when deciding ap-
peals of EHB decisions. 6 Specifically, the recent case Eagle Environ-
mental II, L.P. v. Commonwealth (Eagle)7 provides an understanding
of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth and Supreme Court's review of
EHB decisions while focusing on one integral analysis of environ-
mental law - the Harms/Benefits Test. 8 In Eagle, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed the DEP's decision of two consolidated
1. See William Hofmann & Steven Horst, The EHB: DEP's Friend or Foe? Envi-
ronmental Hearing Board Review, 15 VILL. ENvTm. L.J. 173, 173 (2004) (noting in-
creased importance of land and air preservation in recent years).
2. See id. (indicating EHB operates like court of law). The EHB encourages
citizens to have counsel, even though representation is only required for corpora-
tions. See id. at 174.
3. See id. at 173 (describing history of EHB).
4. See id. (detailing roles of EQB and EHB). The EQB promulgated environ-
mental regulations whereas the EHB heard and decided appeals regarding the
DEP actions. See id.
5. See id. (indicating role of EHB). The EHB has statewidejurisdiction. See id.
6. For a complete analysis of the standard of review of the EHB, Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see infra notes 43-62 and
accompanying text.
7. 884 A.2d 867 (Pa. 2005).
8. See id. at 871 (stating Harms/Benefits analysis weighs potential and real
environmental, social and economic benefits versus harms and mitigation efforts).
(119)
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cases.9 Eagle concerns an appeal of the constitutionality of the
DEP's consideration of the Harms/Benefits Test and the EHB's re-
view of Harms/Benefits Test analysis.10
This Note reviews the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's analysis of
the EHB decision in Eagle regarding the Harms/Benefits Test. Part
II of this Note details the facts, procedural history and holding of
Eagle." Part III briefly explains the background of the EHB, the
Pennsylvania Supreme and Commonwealth Courts' standards and
scopes of review, the basic considerations involved in the Harms/
Benefits Test and brief backgrounds of both the Solid Waste Man-
agement Act (SWMA) and the Municipal Waste Planning, Re-
cycling and Waste Reduction Act (Act 101).12 Part IV summarizes
the analysis and reasoning that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
employed in Eagle.13 Part V analyzes the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's opinion in light of the precedent. 14 Finally, Part VI ex-
plores the potential impact of this decision. 15
II. FACTS
The challenges in this case concern two entities, Eagle Envi-
ronmental II, L.P. (Eagle) and Tri-County Landfill (Tri-County),
which were completing the same permit process with the EQB.16
One challenge in this case concerns Eagle's appeal of an applica-
tion for a permit to construct and operate the Royal Oak Landfill, a
residual waste landfill. 17 In accordance with requirements set forth
in state regulations, Eagle identified a number of benefits to the
project, including both potential and actual short-term and real
long-term benefits. 18 Eagle also discussed the possible mitigation
9. See id. (noting that Eagle and Tri-County merged into one appeal).
10. See id. at 876 (appealing from commonwealth court's order affirming
EQB and constitutionality of regulation).
11. For a full discussion of facts and procedural history, see infra notes 16-39
and accompanying text.
12. For a full discussion of background, see infra notes 40-107 and accompa-
nying text.
13. For a full discussion of court's analysis, see infra notes 108-80 and accom-
panying text.
14. For a full analysis of court's opinion, see infra notes 181-240 and accompa-
nying text.
15. For a full discussion of impact of decision, see infra notes 241-55 and ac-
companying text.
16. See Eagle Envtl. II, L.P. v. Commonwealth, 884 A.2d 867, 870 (Pa. 2005)
(identifying appellants).
17. See id. at 876 (noting appeal concerns subsection (c), Harms/Benefits
analysis, which Eagle claimed was unconstitutional).
18. See id. at 871-72 (listing potential short-term benefits as: disposal of debris
in event of disaster; payments for health and safety training courses for landfill
2
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efforts available for potential harms resulting from the landfill.1 9 In
weighing the benefits and harms, the DEP found the benefits were
greater and granted a conditional permit.20 Eagle followed with an
appeal to the EHB.2
1
Eagle also filed for summary judgment of Chest Township's ap-
peal claiming the Harms/Benefits Test was invalid, unconstitu-
tional and the SWMA and Act 101 (collectively "the Acts") did not
have the authority to regulate. 22 The EHB denied Eagle's motion
because the regulation was adopted according to the EQB's legisla-
tive rule-making authority.23 After looking to the purposes of the
Acts, the EHB concluded the regulation was within its authority.24
operators; and use of coal excavated from site). Real short-term benefits outlined
included: economic benefits, such as jobs for local residents; increased employ-
ment at businesses associated with or located near landfill; host fee to township;
and recycling drop-off center provision. See id. at 871. Real long-term benefits in-
cluded: "replacement of wetland acreage . . .; improvement of roads leading to
landfill; benefit to wetlands in form of landfill runoff and reduced erosion; recla-
mation of strip mine and resulting visual enhancement and increased soil fertility."
Id. at 872.
19. See id. at 872 (indicating potential harm of malfunction of leachate treat-
ment plant could be mitigated with proper operation of storage tank). The nega-
tive impact on residents was anticipatory and could be resolved by working with
them. See id. Eagle indicated several harms with a mitigation effort for each. See
id. Eagle also identified the long-term harm of converting woodland into grass-
land but suggested that this is also a benefit because it would increase the species
in the area. See id.
20. See id. (noting that because harms were only potential harms while bene-
fits were real, permit was granted on August 3, 2001).
21. SeeEagle, 884 A.2d at 872 (contesting Condition 22 of conditional permit).
Condition 22 stated "[f]ailure to provide for all benefits described in these submis-
sions would invalidate the Harms/Benefits analysis and will be a violation of this
permit." Id. Eagle appealed because it could be subject to penalties if it did not
supply benefits even if the benefits were outside its control. See id.
22. See id. at 872-73 (arguing benefits did not outweigh harms). Chest Town-
ship and the DEP also challenged Eagle's standing to assert claim based on poten-
tial injury. The EHB decided the claim in Eagle's favor because Eagle would be
barred from challenging lawfulness of condition if it did not object within thirty
days of permit. See id. at 872-73 n.5.
23. See id. at 873 (noting courts must give regulation same deference as
adopted statute, so long as regulation was (a) within authority given to adopting
agency, (b) issued by proper procedure and (c) reasonable). Eagle only chal-
lenged the first factor. See id.
24. See id. (detailing broad authority given to EQB by section 105 of SWMA to
adopt rules and regulations needed to accomplish purpose of Act). The EHB also
looked at section 102 to examine purposes of the Act, which gave agency authority
to consider economic and social factors in addition to environmental harms. See
id. The Act referenced Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and
the court concluded the reference implied a need to balance environmental and
social concerns, also providing authority for the Harms/Benefits Test. See id.
2007]
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The EHB also stated the Harms/Benefits Test did not violate
the Pennsylvania Constitution.25 In deciding this issue, the EHB
determined that to breach the non-delegation doctrine the deci-
sion must be a basic policy choice that is passed to other agencies,
which is not the role of the Harms/Benefits Test.2 6 The EHB also
concluded that the Harms/Benefits Test was within the Common-
wealth's police power because it promoted public health and gen-
eral well-being. 27  Finally, the EHB examined the potential
vagueness of the statute and held it was sufficiently clear.28
Tri-County's challenge concerned a similar appeal.29 Tri-
County filed a "Substitute Repermitting Application" so it could
construct a municipal waste landfill in Mercer County, near the
Grove City Airport.30 Tri-County followed the requisite procedure,
and the DEP denied the permit because the harms outweighed the
benefits. 31 Tri-County followed with an appeal to the EHB for sum-
mary judgment, contesting the validity of the Harms/Benefits Test,
which the EHB denied.32
In affirming the EHB's decision, the commonwealth court ex-
amined several factors.33 The commonwealth court decided the
Acts had the broad supervisory power of the EQB.3 4 Next, the com-
monwealth court considered the legislative intent of Article I, sec-
tion 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which calls for the
balancing of environmental concerns against social and economic
25. See id. at 873-74 (referencing non-delegation doctrine, commonwealth po-
lice power and vagueness).
26. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 873-74 (holding legislature instead made basic policy
decision to allow landfills that were restricted by comprehensive waste manage-
ment program protecting public's health, safety and welfare and environment).
27. See id. at 874 (noting police power may be used to protect public from
harm and promote health and general well-being, which was underlying purpose
of Harms/Benefits Test).
28. See id. (indicating statute provided sufficient notice and could be nar-
rowed upon consultation with DEP). The EHB also noted that in light of variables
in permit process, a more specific regulation would be difficult to draft. See id.
29. See id. at 875-76 (indicating similarities between two cases).
30. See id. at 874-75 (stating regulation at issue here came to fruition while
permit application was pending).
31. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 875 (stating Tri-County laid out potential harms and
benefits but DEP determined mitigation efforts for harms were lacking). The
DEP's primary reason was the lack of mitigation effort for increased risk of aircraft
striking birds that were attracted to food waste in landfill. See id.
32. See id. (denying appeal based on decision of Eagle's motion for summary
judgment). The commonwealth court allowed Eagle to consolidate its appeal with
Tri-County. See id.
33. See id. (affirming EHB's decision on February 10, 2003).
34. See id. (noting power of SWMA and Act 101 to utilize Harms/Benefits Test
when considering health, safety and welfare).
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concerns. 35 Further, the lower court found in Eagle that the non-
delegation doctrine was not violated nor was the doctrine unconsti-
tutionally vague.3 6 Additionally, the test did not violate police
power because of the benefits arising from the project.3 7
As consolidated parties, Eagle and Tri-County appealed from
the commonwealth court's order.38 The parties challenged the
Harms/Benefits Test on the following bases: the regulation was not
within the authority granted to the EQB; the authority granted to
the EQB was a violation of the non-delegation doctrine of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution; the regulation was unconstitutionally vague;
and the provision benefits went beyond the police power of the
Commonwealth. 39
III. BACKGROUND
A. Environmental Hearing Board
The role of the EHB is to operate separately from the DEP as a
trial court to hear environmental cases.40 The jurisdiction of the
EHB is limited because it can only hear environmental cases that
challenge final actions of the DEP.4 1 Additionally, cases decided by
the EHB can be appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court and then to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.4 2
35. See id. (interpreting legislative intent by referencing Pennsylvania
Constitution).
36. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 875 (holding SWMA and Act 101's delegation of
authority allowed for Harms/Benefits analysis was specific enough).
37. See id. (holding that all factors taken together indicate SWMA and Act 101
were not unconstitutional).
38. See id. at 876 (noting discontent with commonwealth court's decision to
affirm EQB holding and constitutionality of regulation).
39. See id. (indicating issues on appeal).
40. See Hofmann & Horst, supra note 1, at 173 (indicating role of EHB).
41. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7514 (2005) (detailing jurisdiction of EHB re-
mains statewide). See also Hofmann & Horst, supra note 1, at 174 (explaining
EHB's jurisdiction).
42. See Hofmann & Horst, supra note 1, at 174 (discussing appeal order).
Cases appealed from the EHB to the commonwealth court, like appeals from the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, must follow specific guidelines. 25 PA.
CODE § 1021 (2006). Appellants must file a notice of appeal within thirty days of
issuance of other action of the DEP. See id. § 1021.52a. When the party is pro-
testing an issuance of a permit, they must come forward with evidence to show, on
the record produced before the EHB, that issuance of the permit was arbitrary or
amounted to an abuse of discretion. See id. Additionally, on appeal, common-
wealth court will not reevaluate the EHB's credibility determinations or reweigh
this evidence. See id.
2007]
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1. Standard of Review: EHB
There are differing standards of review in Pennsylvania for the
EHB, the commonwealth court and the Supreme Court.43 The
EHB reviews cases de novo, deciding cases based upon the evidence
presented to the DEP. 44 The de novo standard of review evolved
from a notable case, Smedley v. DEP (Smedley). 45 Before Smedley,
courts used an abuse of discretion standard.46 The old standard
required appellants to demonstrate the following: (1) bad faith or
fraud; (2) capricious action or an abuse of power; or (3) manifest
and flagrant abuse of discretion or purely arbitrary action.47 In
other words, an appellant needed to show the DEP erred "to the
extent of having shown manifestly unreasonable judgment, partial-
ity, prejudice, bias, ill-will, misapplication or overriding of the law,
or similarly egregious transgressions." 48
The court in Smedley determined that the abuse of discretion
standard was not suitable because it aimed to flag the DEP's deci-
sions as flagrantly wrong. 49 The court rationalized that the prior
methodology was imprudent unless the EHB acted as a tribunal of
first impression. 50 Instead of merely looking for the DEP's pure
43. For a full discussion of the EHB's differing standards of review, see infra
notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
44. See Hofmann & Horst, supra note 1, at 175 (noting evidence may differ
from what DEP considered when EHB determines that DEP abused discretion and
thus can exercise own discretion).
45. See Smedley v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 97-253-K, 2001 WL 178234 at *14
(Pa.Env.Hrg.Bd. Feb. 8, 2001) (reviewing abuse of discretion standard). Smedley
involved an appeal of the issuance of permit allowing a modification to an air
quality monitor under the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Act. See id. at *1.
The permit modified an existing air quality permit to allow a prescribed quantity
of Tire Derived Fuel (TDF) for coal as fuel in its two boilers at a paper manufactur-
ing plant. See id. Smedley challenged the DEP's grant of the permit because: (1)
addition of TDF to the fuel stream could not qualify as a "minor operating permit
modification;" (2) the addition of TDF would result in an increase of emissions of
various contaminants, some linked to adverse health impacts; (3) the DEP erred by
neglecting to require more testing before granting the modification; and (4) the
DEP did not conduct a compliance history review before granting the modifica-
tion. See id. Smedley asserted the modification would cause "air pollution" in vio-
lation of Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See id.
46. See id. at *14 (reviewing abuse of discretion standard).
47. See id. (outlining appellant's burden). Smedley had the burden of pro-
ceeding and the burden of proof. See id.
48. See id. (showing abuse of discretion standard exceeded mere difference of
opinion).
49. See id. (noting standard of review described by DEP was more appropriate
when appellate court reviewed complete record generated either from lower court
or specialized administrative agency).
50. See Smedley, 2001 WL 178234 at *14 (noting standard of review was
adequate).
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abuse of discretion, the de novo standard of review evaluates the
case anew and allows the EHB to substitute its decision for that of
the prior decision-maker.5 1 In particular, the EHB takes a fresh
look at the evidence to determine whether the DEP made a deci-
sion that was unreasonable or capricious based on the evidentiary
record.
52
To reach its decision, the EHB cannot simply review the evi-
dentiary record; it must consider all relevant evidence at issue, even
if the evidence was not permitted at the time the DEP granted the
permit.53 Nevertheless, the EHB does not have access to any evi-
dentiary findings, as they are still bound by the primary rules of
evidence, particularly relevancy.54
2. Standard of Review: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
When the commonwealth court reviews EHB decisions, its re-
view is limited to an assessment of whether the EHB committed a
constitutional violation or error of law. 55 It is within the province of
the commonwealth court to determine if the EHB erred in its re-
view of the DEP's decision.5 6 For instance, in Browning-Ferris Indus-
tries v. Commonwealth (Browning-Ferris) 57 the commonwealth court
reviewed an EHB decision for an error of law.58 The court then
reviewed the evidence that the EHB previously examined and the
EHB's analysis of the evidence. 59
51. See id. (re-deciding case based upon factual findings and evidentiary
record).
52. See id. (stating review of evidentiary record allowed EHB to establish
whether previous findings were correct and reasonable).
53. See Leatherwood, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 819 A.2d 604, 610-11 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2003) (noting that EHB is not appellate body with limited scope of
review). The EHB's duty is to determine if the DEP's action can be sustained or
supported by the new evidence. See id.
54. See id. at 611 (stressing that some evidence may not be permitted because
not relevant).
55. See Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 819 A.2d 148,
152-53 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (noting EHB is independent quasi-judicial agency
that is not intended to play policy-making role).
56. See id. (referencing EHB's discretionary review standard of DEP decisions,
specifically that EHB may substitute its discretion for DEP).
57. 819 A.2d 148 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
58. See id. at 153 (contesting EHB's conclusion that new present value of host
fees paid to Berks County and New Morgan Borough was not benefit in Harms/
Benefits Test).
59. See id. (finding evidence did not support EHB's conclusion that increase
in host fees was not economic benefit). The EHB did not support its position with
statutory or case law authority; accordingly, the commonwealth court concluded
the EHB committed an error of law. See id.
2007]
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3. Standard of Review: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania conducts a plenary review
of the commonwealth court's decisions. 60 In decisions that review
interpretations of statutes or the constitutionality of regulations,
the supreme court does not limit itself to a mere review of the law
but looks to the purpose and reasonable effect of the statute or
regulation. 6' In doing so, the court gives "great weight" to the
agency's interpretation of its enabling statute and will not overturn
it unless the decision is clearly erroneous. 62
B. Municipal and Residual Waste Regulations
The EQB published final regulations concerning municipal
and residual waste landfills, which promulgated environmental as-
sessment criteria for facilities. 63 The regulations require applicants
who seek permits for municipal and residual waste facilities to iden-
tify potential and real environmental harms, as well as social and
economic benefits. 64 It is the DEP's responsibility to assess an appli-
cation according to the regulation and to approve an application if
the benefits outweigh the harms. 65
The first subsection of the regulations requires permits to indi-
cate an analysis of potential impacts that the facility has on the "en-
vironment, public health and public safety, including traffic,
aesthetics, air quality, water quality, stream flow, fish and wildlife,
plants, aquatic habitat, threatened or endangered species, water
uses and land use."66 The following subsection requires the appli-
60. See Eagle Envtl. II, L.P. v. Commonwealth, 884 A.2d 867, 877-78 (Pa. 2005)
(noting challenges to constitutionality of regulations are pure questions of law).
Plenary review is a full and complete review that covers all matters. See id.
61. See id. (citing Gilligan v. Pa. Horse Racing Comm'n, 422 A.2d 487, 490
(Pa. 1980)) (referencing procedure when determining whether power has been
delegated).
62. See id. at 878 (citing Anela v. Pa. Hous. Fin. Agency, 690 A.2d 1157, 1159
(Pa. 1997)) (noting that agency's rule-making power must be proper).
63. See id. (noting two regulations contain nearly identical language and only
differ in type of facility); 25 PA. CODE § 271.127 (2006) (concerning municipal
waste effective December 23, 2000); 25 PA. CODE § 287.127 (regulating residual
waste effective January 13, 2001).
64. See Tri-County Indus., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 818 A.2d 574, 577 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2003) (listing applicant's duty to identify environmental harms and
social and economic benefits as general requirements of regulations).
65. See id. at 576 (summarizing DEP's balancing test).
66. SeeEagle, 884 A.2d at 870-71 (citing 25 PA. CODE §§ 271.127(a), 287.127(a)
(2006)) (detailing further considerations of environmental features such as:
"scenic rivers, recreational river corridors, local parks, State and Federal forests
and parks, the Appalachian trail, historic and archaeological sites, National wildlife
refuges, State natural areas, National landmarks, farmland, wetland, special protec-
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol18/iss1/6
WHO DECIDES THE STANDARD OF REVIEW?
cant to describe potential and known environmental harms, to
identify possible mitigation plans for the known or potential harms
and to describe harms that cannot be mitigated. 67 The last subsec-
tion sets forth the Harms/Benefits Test where the applicant must
show how the benefits of the project clearly outweigh the known
and potential environmental harms.68
C. Harms/Benefits Test
The Harms/Benefits Test gives residents a voice in the permit
process, but it also ensures there is a benefit to the community
when landfills and other potentially harmful facilities are built.6 9
The test specifically balances the negative impact of a project on
the surrounding community against any environmental, social or
economic benefits gained.70 A permit is allowed if the benefits to
the public outweigh any potential or known harms by a mere
scintilla.71
When determining the economic and social considerations,
the courts have not yet established a set standard.7 2 Specifically, the
courts consider social and economic conditions on a case-by-case
basis.7 3 For instance, the commonwealth court in Browning-Ferris
examined whether a potential increase in host fees constituted an
economic and social benefit.74 The court denied the contention
tion watersheds ... airports, public water supplies and other features deemed ap-
propriate by the Department or the application"). In addition, section 271.127(a)
also requires analysis of impacts on municipal waste plans. See id.
67. See id. (citing 25 PA. CODE §§ 271.127(b), 287.127(b)) (commenting that
DEP reviews assessment and mitigation plans to determine if plans actually miti-
gate known or potential harms). The DEP also reviews mitigation proposals to
ensure they "adequately protect the environment and the public health, safety and
welfare." Id.
68. See id. (citing 25 PA. CODE §§ 271.127(c), 287.127(c)) (noting subsection
at issue in this case). Benefits relied upon should be accounted for in detail, in-
cluding both social, economic and environmental benefits, and harms must in-
clude both social and economic harms. See id. The applicant must consider the
harms and mitigation measures discussed in previous section in analysis. See id.
69. See id. (insinuating benefit of test).
70. See 25 PA. CODE § 287.127(a) (outlining factors to weigh).
71. See Browning-Ferris v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 819 A.2d 148, 154 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2003) (citing 25 PA. CODE § 271.127(c)) (discussing weight of needed
evidence).
72. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 877 (stating Harms/Benefits Test provides broad
authority).
73. See id. (suggesting strict standard not established).
74. See Browning-Ferris, 819 A.2d at 154 (concerning landfill company that
filed petition for review rescinding modification permit issued by DEP to landfill
company allowing landfill to increase its average daily volume by 2000 tons per day
and sustaining homeowners' appeal of issuance of modification permit, and home-
owners' cross-petition for review).
2007]
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that the fees could not be deemed a benefit because there was a
lack of evidence showing where the fees would be expended.7 5
In Berks County v. Department of Environmental Protection (Berks
County),76 the commonwealth court explored a wide-range of bene-
fits including, economic benefits to the Commonwealth, increased
employment opportunities for citizens, environmental clean-up ini-
tiatives, charitable contributions and disposal benefits to the com-
munity.77 The benefits considered were not at issue in Berks County,
although some benefits went directly to the state without any indi-
cation of how the funds would be utilized. 78 As such, courts apply a
case-by-case analysis of benefits deemed appropriate. 79 In this case,
the court determined the state had not accounted for its economic
return.80
Proposals must describe the known and potential environmen-
tal harms of the proposed project, as well as the mitigation plans.81
Courts assess the real and potential harms along with the mitigation
efforts on a case-by-case basis. 82 In Leatherwood, Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Protection (Leatherwood),83 the DEP contemplated real
and potential harms posed by a landfill located near an airport.84
The commonwealth court and the DEP focused on the potential
harm of aircrafts striking birds that were attracted to landfill
75. See id. at 153-54 (stating DEP did not investigate how town or county
would spend increased funds but since host fees clearly brought in economic gain,
it could not be considered detriment).
76. 894 A.2d 183 (Pa. 2006).
77. See id. at 187 (listing benefits considered and accepted by DEP included:
(1) host municipality benefit fee to Exeter Township; (2) recycling fees given to
Commonwealth; (3) environmental stewardship fee paid to Commonwealth; (4)
continued and additional employment opportunities at landfill; (5) landfill's
purchase of local and regional goods; (6) contribution of two acres of land and
$275,000 for relocation of First Baptist Church and environmental clean-up of that
site, contamination which was not caused by Landfill; (7) income and sales taxes to
Commonwealth from landfill employees; (8) presentations to schools and tours of
landfill facilities for students; (9) charitable contributions to local civil, social, ath-
letic, educational, religious and community groups; (10) free township-wide spring
clean-up for Excter Township; (1) free disposal of "white goods" for Exeter Town-
ship residents; (12) property tax revenues; and (13) on-site recycling drop-off).
78. See id. at 191-92 (appealing error in consideration of harms, not benefits).
79. See id. (detailing general court analysis).
80. See id. (appealing error in consideration of harms, not benefits).
81. See 25 PA. CODE § 287.127(b) (indicating requirements for permit
proposal).
82. See Leatherwood, Inc. v. Dept. ofEnvtl. Prot., 819 A.2d 604, 608 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2003) (weighing factors).
83. 819 A.2d 604 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
84. See id. (appealing EHB order revoking solid waste permit issued by DEP
which allowed construction and operation of landfill near county airport because
of known risk of bird/aircraft collisions).
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waste. 85 The feasible mitigation efforts were not sufficient to lessen
the risk of the potential bird hazard, and as a result, the EHB de-
nied the permit and the commonwealth court affirmed its
decision. 86
The Commonwealth must perform the Harms/Benefits bal-
ancing test according to Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.8 7 Article I, section 27 provides:
The people have a right to clear air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, in-
cluding generations yet to come. As trustee of these re-
sources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain
them for the benefit of all the people.88
State agencies can perform the process of balancing the benefits
and harms.8 9 In Payne v. Kassab (Payne),90 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court discussed, in reference to the allotment of authority,
that the Amendment declares the Commonwealth is trustee of cer-
tain resources. 9 1 Thus, the Commonwealth, by way of the Depart-
ment of Transportation, has authority to approve and disapprove
proposals affecting natural resources.9 2 The court referenced the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which allows state departments to assess
the harm, so long as it stays within the confines of the relevant stat-
utes and regulations.9 3 The record demonstrated an effort to re-
85. See id. at 611 (indicating that mitigation efforts to address specific issue
were essential).
86. See id. at 610-15 (stating that Leatherwood's expert-prepared Bird Control
Plan was not sufficient mitigation).
87. See Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 273 (Pa. 1976) (stating Commonwealth
has duty to protect environment and serve public).
88. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
89. See Payne, 361 A.2d at 272 (noting court allowed Department of Transpor-
tation to consider several factors in decision).
90. 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
91. See id. at 272 (seeking to halt street-widening project proposed by Penn-
sylvania Department of Transportation because they claimed it had adverse impact
on area, that PennDot did not comply with Pennsylvania Constitution and project
was impermissible revocation of dedicated public land). The lower court dis-
missed their complaint holding that the proposed use did not violate statutory
dedications because the project was for the benefit of the public. See id.
92. See id. (indicating Commonwealth had duty to decide whether River
Street project was appropriate after taking into account effect on natural
resources).
93. See id. (referencing Pennsylvania Constitution).
2007] 129
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duce environmental harm, and the benefits clearly outweigh the
harms. 94
D. Solid Waste Management Act
The SWMA regulates solid waste, namely municipal residual
and hazardous waste. 95 The SWMA directs the DEP "to develop,
prepare and modify the Pennsylvania Hazardous Waste Facilities
Plan," noting particularly, the plan "shall address the present and
future needs for the treatment and disposal of hazardous waste in
this Commonwealth." 96 The purpose of the SWMA is the following:
(1) to establish a reliable program for solid waste management; (2)
to encourage the development of resource recovery to manage
solid waste, conserve resources and supply energy; (3) to require
permits for disposal facilities; (4) to protect public health, safety
and welfare from waste threats; (5) to provide a means to enforce
provisions of the act; (6) to establish Pennsylvania Hazardous Waste
Facilities Plan, addressing present and future needs concerning
hazardous waste; (7) to develop an inventory of hazardous waste in
the Commonwealth; (8) to project future sources of hazardous
waste; (9) to provide methods of establishing hazardous waste facil-
ity sites; (10) to implement Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution; and (11) to utilize private enterprise to accomplish
the above objectives.9 7
The SWMA has several criteria for citing hazardous waste treat-
ment and disposal facilities.98 The criteria include the inventory
and evaluation of sources of hazardous waste concentration, as well
as current hazardous waste practices. 99 In determining future facil-
ity needs, the SWMA evaluates existing treatment and disposal facil-
ities, existing and projected generation of hazardous waste and the
94. See Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (noting that
when balancing social and environmental concerns, court must adhere to three-
fold standard).
95. See Hofmann & Horst, supra note 1, at 178 (discussing role of SWMA in
solid waste management).
96. See Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Background Pa-
per on Hazardous Waste, available at http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/subject/
advcoun/solidwst/2001/091301/backgroundpaperonhazardouswaste.htm (last
visited Jan. 26, 2007) (summarizing Hazardous Waste Facilities Plan).
97. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6018.102 (2005) (detailing legislative policy of
SWMA).
98. See Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, supra note 96
(noting requirement met by 1986 plan and regulations can be found at 25 PA.
CODE § 269).
99. See id. (including types and quantities of hazardous waste as well as ex-
isting hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities).
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projected generation of hazardous waste outside the Common-
wealth that is expected to be transported into storage treatment or
disposal facilities inside the Commonwealth.' 00 The SWMA also
analyzes methods, incentives and technologies for source reduc-
tion, detoxification, reuse and recovery of hazardous waste, as well
as strategies for implementing these methods and technologies. 0 1
The SWMA is also responsible for identifying additional hazardous
waste treatment and disposal facilities.'0 2
E. Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction
Act (Act 101)
Act 101 concerns the authority for and requirements imposed
upon counties planning for management of municipal waste gener-
ated within their boundaries as well as the authority and limitation
of municipalities to regulate waste activities and the program for
municipal waste recycling within Pennsylvania.10 3 Similar to the
SWMA, the Pennsylvania statute sets forth a detailed account of
thirteen purposes of Act 101.104 Overall, the purpose of Act 101 is
to reach the following four goals: (1) reduce Pennsylvania's genera-
tion of municipal waste; (2) recycle a certain percentage of waste
generated; (3) procure and use recycled and recyclable materials in
state government agencies; and (4) educate the public as to the
benefits of recycling and waste reduction. 10 5 Act 101 provides the
benefits of recycling and waste reduction that include: reduced pol-
lution risks; conservation of natural resources, energy and landfill
100. See id. (projecting hazardous waste).
101. See id. (discussing other duties of SWMA).
102. See id. (indicating additional duties of SWMA).
103. See Hofmann & Horst, supra note 1, at 179 (discussing Act 101).
104. See 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4000.102(b) (2005) (detailing purpose of Act
101). The purposes of Act 101 include: (1) to establish program to assist munici-
pal waste management; (2) to encourage waste reduction; (3) to protect public
health, safety and welfare from disposal of municipal waste; (4) to encourage effec-
tive means of implementation; (5) to utilize a private enterprise to accomplish
objectives; (6) to implement a recycling fee for landfills to provide grants for re-
cycling; (7) to establish a benefit fee for waste facilities that are permitted after
implementation of Act; (8) to employ a site-specific post-closure fee for currently
operating and future landfills for emergency action necessary to prevent adverse
effects; (9) to set up a trust fund to ensure ample funds to cover clean-up costs;
(10) to move the primary responsibility of development of municipal waste man-
agement plans to counties; (11) to require public agencies to aid and promote
development of recycling; (12) to require particular regions to have recycling pro-
grams that return items to good use; (13) to implement Article I, Section 27 of
Pennsylvania Constitution; and (14) increase department's authority of regulation
of daily waste volumes. See id.
105. See 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4000.102(c) (2005) (detailing goals of Act 101).
Goals are as follows:
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space; and reduced disposal costs. 10 6 Thus, Act 101 serves to ensure
that public health, safety and welfare are properly protected. 10 7
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Eagle, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the
respective decisions of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and
the EHB, holding that the SWMA and Act 101 regulations were
within the authority of the DEP, and there was no error in their
decisions regarding the permits.10 8 In particular, the Harms/Bene-
fits Test was within the authority granted by the Acts. 10 9 Further,
the Acts were constitutional because the Harms/Benefits Test did
not violate the non-delegation doctrine.110 The court concluded
the Harms/Benefits Test was not unconstitutionally vague." '
(1) At least 25% of all municipal waste and source-separated recyclable
materials generated in this Commonwealth on and afterJanuary 1, 1997,
should be recycled.
(2) The weight or volume of municipal waste generated per capita in this
Commonwealth on January 1, 1997, should, to the greatest extent practi-
cable, be less than the weight or volume of municipal waste generated per
capita on the effective date of this act.
(3) Each person living or working in this Commonwealth shall be taught
the economic, environmental and energy value of recycling and waste
reduction and shall be encouraged through a variety of means to partici-
pate in such activities.
(4) The Commonwealth should, to the greatest extent practicable, pro-
cure and use products and materials with recycled content and procure
and use materials that are recyclable.
Id.
106. See id. § 4000.102 (detailing goals of Act 101).
107. See Hofmann & Horst, supra note 1, at 179 (detailing appeals that ques-
tioned DEP's and EHB's authority to enforce regulations).
108. See Eagle Envtl. II, L.P. v. Commonwealth, 884 A.2d 867, 873, 875 (Pa. 2005)
(affirming commonwealth court decision). The two cases, Eagle and Ti-County,
were consolidated for judicial economy because they were essentially challenging
the same issues. See id. When Tri-County appealed the DEP's decision to the EHB,
it was denied based on Eagle's successful motion for summary judgment. See id.
The case was, however, certified for interlocutory appeal, and Eagle was permitted
to consolidate its appeal with Tri-County. See id. Once in the commonwealth
court, the EHB's decision was affirmed, and Eagle and Tri-County appealed. See
id. at 875-76.
109. See id. at 875-78 (pointing to authority granted in SWMA section 105
giving EQB broad power to adopt rules and regulations to accomplish purposes of
Act).
110. See id. at 880-81 (specifying that Harms/Benefits Test was not policy
choice).
111. See id. at 875, 882 (indicating that regulation provided entities with suffi-
cient notice and was capable of being narrowed).
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A. Is the Harms/Benefits Test Within Authority Granted by
the Acts?
The EQB is authoritative because it is permitted to demand the
balancing of social and economic benefits and may be allowed to
expand its permitted authority.112 Here, appellants referenced Ar-
ticle I, section 27, indicating that it does not give the EQB the au-
thority to demand that parties present the social and economic
benefits to a project before obtaining a permit. 113 Specifically,
there is no requirement for balancing the benefits and harms.
114
Not only was balancing not required, but the language in the stat-
ute was intended to limit powers of the Commonwealth, not ex-
pand them. 115
Appellants asserted a strict textual argument that if the legisla-
ture intended such a result, it would be clearly written in the stat-
ute.1 16 Appellants argued because the statute lacks language
concerning social and economic benefits, the EQB's authority must
remain centered on the evaluation of a project's potential impact
on the environment, not the social and economic benefits.' 17 Ap-
pellants reasoned that if the statute were read to include social and
economic benefits, then all environmental statutes could be
stretched. 81
Appellants also contended that balancing is outside the
agency's power because the legislature, not the agency, is responsi-
ble for providing economic benefits and incentives to waste facili-
ties. 119 Appellants purported that the Harms/Benefits Test may
allow the Acts to grant a permit application that should not be per-
mitted because it is harmful.' 20 Overall, appellants maintained the
Harms/Benefits Test was an overly broad policy, and if it was not
112. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 876 (discussing appellants' disagreement with EQB
authority under Pennsylvania Constitution).
113. See id. (discussing appellants' argument).
114. See id. at 877 (noting that legislature made basic policy choice for balanc-
ing impact of potential landfills on health, safety and environment).
115. See id. at 876-77 (arguing that Commonwealth's balancing was expanding
power over private property, which was specific to General Assembly).
116. See id. (laying out appellants' argument regarding language of statute).
117. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 877 (indicating appellants' argument).
118. See id. (arguing EQB's authority should be limited to regulations that
evaluate potential impact on environment).
119. See id. (asserting that legislature provided limited economic benefits to
communities in order to influence hosting of disposal facilities).
120. See id. (insinuating Acts misinterpret purpose of Harms/Benefits Test
and allow project solely on economic and social benefit).
20071
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properly regulated, it would always find a social and economic value
that outweighs the environmental harms. 121
The court first disputed appellants' interpretation of the
SWMA, noting this Act is to be interpreted broadly in order for it to
serve its purpose. 122 The court cited the applicable provisions man-
dating the purpose and goal of the Acts and their interaction with
the applicable subsection of the pertinent Pennsylvania Code sec-
tion, namely, the Harms/Benefits Test.1 23 The court also noted
that the role of the DEP is to ensure that the mitigation efforts pro-
posed by applicants do, in fact, mitigate the harms. 124 Thus, the
environment is "adequately protected."'125 This means the Harms/
Benefits Test would not be applied unless the first subsections were
satisfied, significantly lowering the chance of applying the test
inaccurately. 126
The court specified, however, that "adequate" protection did
not mean that all harms were eliminated; it merely served as a
threshold. 127 Expressly, the goal of subsection (c) is to protect
against potential economic losses from improper waste manage-
ment.128 The court noted the contemplation of the economic im-
plications of landfills was practical, considering the potential
detrimental effects it may have on property value.1 29
The Pennsylvania Constitution also emphasizes that the
Harms/Benefits analysis is within the authority of the Acts.' 30 The
court cited Payne to reiterate that the inclusion of the Harms/Bene-
fits Test, even without a specific holding, is within the authority of
121. See id. (indicating bias in favor of social and economic effects if consid-
ered by Acts, not legislature).
122. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 878 (noting SWMA to be liberally construed and
overriding goal of SWMA and Act 101 was to establish state and local solid waste
management programs that disposed of waste but also protected environment).
123. See id. (referencing 25 PA. CODE §§ 271.127(c), 287.127(c)) (indicating
that subsection (c) grants general authority to EQB to establish rules and regula-
tions for purposes of SWMA and Act 101).
124. See id. (reasoning that purposes of SWMA and Act 101 are carried out
under statute and Harms/Benefits Test does not apply unless subsection (a) and
(b) are properly satisfied).
125. See id. (concluding requirements satisfied).
126. See id. (explaining how court meets first subsection threshold).
127. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 878 (defining adequate protection).
128. See id. (indicating legislative purpose was for EQB to consider economic
issues while determining if waste permits should be allowed). Subsection (c) al-
lows the DEP to assess both negative and positive economic and social implications
versus environmental harms. See id.
129. See id. at 878 n.14 (noting practical legislative consideration beyond
mere environmental impact).
130. See id. at 879 (asserting implied inclusion).
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the Acts under the Pennsylvania Constitution.1 3 1 Additionally, the
EQB has suggested different considerations are to be taken into ac-
count when performing the balancing test. 132 The DEP must con-
sider such suggestions when evaluating permits under subsection
(c) of the statute. 133
B. Does the Grant of Authority for the Harms/Benefits Test
Violate the Non-Delegation Doctrine, Rendering the
Acts Unconstitutional?
Appellants showed further concern that giving the DEP the au-
thority of weighing harms and benefits will result in the unneces-
sary and uncontrolled discretionary power of the DEP.13 4
Appellants asserted the Acts were unconstitutional because they vio-
lated the non-delegation doctrine of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion.1 35 Specifically, the court held the Acts delegated a basic policy
choice to the EQB, which was not permitted because landowners
have a basic property right to use the land as they see fit.' 36 It was
appellants' contention that the Harms/Benefits Test put the onus
on property owners to prove a public use for their property, which
is not a burden the owners should be expected to meet. 3 7 Appel-
lants also insisted that there was a lack of standards defining how
the agency could adopt the Harms/Benefits Test and other
regulations. 3 8
The court first discussed the heavy burden of persuasion appel-
lants must surpass to prove the unconstitutionality of the Acts.' 39
131. See id. (citing Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 273 (Pa. 1976)) (noting
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed commonwealth court's decision that it did
not violate duties as trustee under Article I, section 27 by complying with statutory
requirements requiring Department of Transportation to weigh factors when
widening road).
132. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 878 (indicating need to protect health, safety, wel-
fare and property from dangers of waste disposal while encouraging private enter-
prise are among considerations during balancing analysis).
133. See id. at 879 (holding Harms/Benefits Test was within authority of DEP
under SWMA and Act 101).
134. See id. at 879-80 (giving foundation for appellants' argument).
135. See id. (stating that non-delegation doctrine does not allow SWMA and
Act 101 to delegate to EQB policy choices reserved by constitution).
136. See id. at 880 (stipulating owners have right to use own property however
they want).
137. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 880 (explaining how, in appellants' opinion, non-
delegation doctrine was violated).
138. See id. (arguing additional contents of invalidity).
139. See id. (indicating presumption in favor of General Assembly's act and
specifying that SWMA and Act 101 would not be held unconstitutional unless they
"clearly, palpably and plainly" violated constitution).
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This does not mean, however, that the General Assembly can dele-
gate authority any way it sees fit: there are clear and strict restraints
on its lawmaking ability.140 In particular, the court reasoned that
the legislature cannot delegate the power to make any law to other
branches of the government, but it is permitted to pass authority in
execution of laws.141 Additionally, the court found that the legisla-
ture is allowed to designate duties to carry out legislative policy to
specific agencies as well as establish the primary standards associ-
ated with a specific law. 142 The power designated to agencies by the
legislature is not without limitations. 143 Specifically, the court rea-
soned that the legislature is in charge of basic policy choices and
there must be standards that guide and restrain delegated
authority.144
In Eagle, the court contended it was the legislature's responsi-
bility to make basic policy decisions as to whether landfills should
be permitted. 145 Specifically, it was the legislature's duty to deter-
mine how the landfill industry would be regulated, namely by the
SWMA and Act 101.146 Deciding how to regulate landfills, how-
ever, was not the legislature's obligation, but rather the role dele-
gated to the EQB. 147 The regulation at issue here, the Harms/
Benefits Test, is part of the EQB's delegated duty to protect
the "safety, health, welfare and property of the public," in addi-
tion to protecting natural resources from the "public health haz-
ards, environmental pollution, and economic loss" that would
result upon improper waste disposal. 148 Delegating such duty
140. See id. (noting restrictions on General Assembly's lawmaking power).
141. See id. (stating authority of legislature to pass discretion to other agencies
regarding implementation of laws).
142. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 880 (maintaining legislature does enjoy some
power to delegate authority).
143. See id. (enumerating specific limitations on delegating power).
144. See id. (indicating that agencies do not enjoy free reign).
145. See id. (stating that although there are drawbacks and harms to landfills,
they are of public necessity).
146. See id. (noting other basic policy decisions made by legislature).
147. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 880 (stating that EQB was responsible for setting
forth specific rules and regulations that protected environment or public). The
EQB made several regulations to serve this purpose; for example, it determined
the thickness of liners of landfills and specifications of road construction near
landfills. See id.
148. See id. (citing 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6018.102, 53 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 4000.102) (conveying that Harms/Benefits Test details assessment occurring
prior to technical review of application and that regulation serves integral function
of legislative purpose behind duties granted to EQB).
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to the EQB was proper, because it did not exceed constitutional
bounds.149
The court also addressed appellants' argument that the
Harms/Benefits Test altered the fundamental property rights of
private citizens by requiring them to give public benefits for their
private use.150 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court highlighted the
flaw in the appellants' reasoning because the land at issue was part
of a highly regulated business, not merely private property. 151 In
addition, the regulation did not require the average private land-
owners to justify their use of property with proof of the benefits to
personal improvements of their property. 152 Instead, the require-
ments were imposed on private business owners operating a certain
type of business embarking on a major project serving a public pur-
pose, thereby validating the applicant's duty to identify the harms
and benefits.153
C. Is the Harms/Benefits Test Unconstitutionally Vague?
A statute is deemed unconstitutionally vague when average
people have differing interpretations of its meaning and pur-
pose.1 54 Thus, a statute is unconstitutionally vague when the lan-
guage does not make it apparent what the statute covers and how it
imposes restrictions. 155 Appellants' third argument concerned the
language of the Harms/Benefits Test. Appellants contended the
subsection was unconstitutionally vague because the EQB did not
define some terms and caused an arbitrary result.156 They argued
that the applicants will not be able to designate adequately the
harms and benefits or properly apply the test, and further, the DEP
149. See id. at 880-81 (noting delegating authority is constitutionally permissi-
ble when legislature makes basic policy choices and also explaining that legislature
must create adequate standards that restrain agencies).
150. See id. at 881 (noting appellants' argument regarding Harms/Benefits
Test).
151. See id. (pointing out that appellants chose to subject themselves to regu-
lations not equivalent to those of private landowners).
152. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 881 (distinguishing between private property and
private business property).
153. See id. (stressing that applicant must identify harms and benefits so DEP
can properly evaluate project).
154. SeeJoy Hollingsworth McMurtry & Patti S. Pennock, Ending the Violence:
Applying the Ku Klux Klan Act, RICO, and FACE to the Abortion Controversy, 30 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 203, 222-23 (1995) (explaining conditions under which statute is
constitutionally vague).
155. See id. (explaining standard for determining unconstitutional
vagueness).
156. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 881 (specifying that EQB did not define "benefit",
"harm" and "clearly outweigh").
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will not be able to offer any guidance. 157 Additionally, appellants
asserted there was no other aid for applicants or the DEP to assist in
a less arbitrary outcome. 58
In response to their argument, the court cited the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution and noted that a law is
unconstitutionally vague when it fails to give citizens enough infor-
mation to determine what is permitted conduct under the law.159
The court also noted which standard of review applied to the vague-
ness challenge depended on the nature of the statute at issue.1 60
More specifically, economic regulations, having a narrow subject
matter, are subject to a less strict vagueness test.1 61 The court also
expressed deference to civil enactments over criminal as well as reg-
ulations that do not inhibit constitutionally protected rights. 162
The Harms/Benefits Test, like economic regulations, applies
to a narrow subject matter and thus, the vagueness standard is not
as strict. 163 Also, in areas where the Harms/Benefits Test is vague,
there are numerous opportunities to modify and clarify specifics as
issues arise.1 64 Furthermore, criminal penalties for violation of the
Harms/Benefits Test are extreme and do not relate to the determi-
nation of actual harms and benefits.1 65 Appellants also failed to
show the test was vague in all of its components.166 Given the com-
mon occurrence of balancing tests, the specific nature of the sub-
ject matter, and the broad application of the vagueness standard,
the court concluded that the Harms/Benefits Test is not unconsti-
tutionally vague.167
157. See id. (indicating appellants' argument as to fault in Harms/Benefits
Test language).
158. See id. (specifying that guidance documents are not binding regulations).
159. See id. (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Es-
tates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982)) (mentioning that standard for proving statute
as unconstitutionally vague requires complainant to show statute is "vague in all its
applications").
160. See id. (discussing vagueness test).
161. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 881 (attributing application of less strict vagueness
test to fact that businesses are expected to consult legislation as action goes on
when business has ability to clarify standards later).
162. See id. (indicating there is less to lose when statutes are vague).
163. See id. at 882 (associating Harms/Benefits Test with business
regulations).
164. See id. (stressing flexibility of alteration at later date).
165. See id. (noting penalties related to Harms/Benefits determination are
only civil).
166. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 882 (indicating balancing tests are commonplace
and specifics do not need to be explained).
167. See id. (keeping door open to later challenges of arbitrary application of
regulation).
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D. Does the Harms/Benefits Test Exceed the Reach of the
Commonwealth's Police Power?
The Commonwealth has particular power to regulate under
state laws and legislation; however, this power is not all-encompass-
ing and has limitations. 168 The United States Supreme Court devel-
oped a three-part test to determine if a state's actions exceed its
police power. 1 69 The test stipulates: (1) the public interest to re-
quire the state's interference; (2) the means are reasonably neces-
sary; and (3) the means are not overly oppressive. 170 So long as the
Commonwealth remains within the confines of the United States
Supreme Court's test, it will not exceed its police power.
1 71
The appellants' final argument claimed the Commonwealth
exceeded its police power because the Harms/Benefits Test served
as a taxation on the industry, extending beyond the concern for the
public's welfare. 17 2 Accordingly, appellants asserted the Harms/
Benefits considerations were outside the scope of the EHB and ex-
ceeded the Commonwealth's police power. 173 The analysis, there-
fore, should be left to other agencies or municipalities.'
7 4
The court maintained the appellants' claim was without merit
because they failed to meet their burden of proof.1 75 In fact, the
Commonwealth's police power allows for the "promot[ion] [of] the
public health, morals or safety and the general well-being of the
community."1 76 To effectuate its standard, the court adopted the
following test:
To justify the state in... interposing its authority in behalf
of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particu-
168. See Mock v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 623 A.2d 940, 947 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1993) (referencing, enacting and enforcing laws for promotion of public welfare
within police power).
169. See id. (discussing police power test).
170. See id. (establishing police power test).
171. See id. (noting barriers of three-part test).
172. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 882 (stating police power does not include benefits
to public, instead only protects public from harm).
173. See id. (maintaining that Harms/Benefits Test does not fall under EHB's
responsibility).
174. See id. (recognizing conditions are aesthetic and should be considered by
municipalities' zoning regulations).
175. See id. (stressing heavy burden of proof needed to show Commonwealth
surpassed its police power).
176. See id. (defining specifics of police power). The court noted further that
even if exercise of police power upset residents, so long as performed reasonably,
the court would not invalidate state actions. See id.
2007]
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lar class, require such interference; and second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.177
The court rejected appellants' challenge of the second prong
of the test because the argument was inaccurate. 178 In particular,
the second prong of the test was warranted because benefits arise as
natural by-products of particular projects, requiring a determina-
tion of any inherent harms and benefits. 179 Thus, the determina-
tion fell within the Commonwealth's police power and was duly
necessary under the Harms/Benefits Test.180
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Plenary Review
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviews an appeal from
the commonwealth court, it adheres to a plenary standard of re-
view. 181 Thus, the court is required to review the lower court's en-
tire record. 182 Such a review requires the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to take the issues one-by-one and determine whether the ap-
pellate court committed an error of law. 183 The case at hand also
concerned a pure question of law: specifically, whether the Harms/
Benefits analysis by the DEP is valid under the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution and the authority granted by the SWMA and Act 101.184
177. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 882 (citing Adams Sanitation Co., Inc. v. Common-
wealth of Pa., Dep't of Envd. Prot., 715 A.2d 390, 395 (Pa. 1998)) (referencing
Lawton test). To prove a truly oppressive governmental action, the court must con-
sider the "economic impact of regulation on the property holder and whether the
governmental interference with property could be characterized as a physical in-
trusion." Id.
178. See id. at 883 (dismissing appellants' argument that second prong of test
was incorrect because landfills providing public benefits was not necessary to pro-
tection of environment, public health, safety or welfare). The court noted the
benefits analyzed under the Harms/Benefits Test could arise as by-products of pro-
ject. See id.
179. See id. (noting industry is highly regulated and must examine all aspects
before granting permits).
180. See id. (holding in favor of Commonwealth).
181. See Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Bd. of Revi-
sion of Taxes, 833 A.2d 710, 713 (Pa. 2003) (noting standard of review is de novo
for questions of law).
182. See id. (conducting plenary review).
183. See Phillips v. A-Best Prods. Co., 665 A.2d 1167, 1170-71 (Pa. 1995) (dis-
cussing standard of review).
184. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 870 (noting overall issue).
22
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Upon review of the first issue, the court broke down the statute
into its pertinent subsections, analyzing the purpose for each sub-
section. 85 The court ensured the interpretation was consistent
with the intended purpose.'8 6 The court did not stop its analysis by
merely determining the DEP properly interpreted the purpose of
the statute, but it took a closer lobk at the actual balancing of harms
and benefits.18 7 In particular, the court re-evaluated the relevant
factors, assessing the economic and social harms. 188 By performing
its own balancing test, the court reconsidered the factors examined
by the lower court and made its own determination of whether the
harms outweighed the benefits.'89 After conducting this analysis,
the court concluded the balancing of a limited number of factors
remained a power of the EQB. 190
When considering the second issue, the court first examined
the legislative intent, back-tracking to look at the reasoning behind
the regulation before considering its application to the issue. 191
The court determined the legislature gave the EQB the specific au-
thority to deal with landfills and the environment. 192 Because the
regulation at issue was within the EQB's authority, the court deter-
mined there was no violation of the non-delegation doctrine. 93
Again, the court did not stray from the plenary standard as it reas-
sessed the basis for determination back to the legislative intent of
185. See id. at 878 (identifying purpose for subsections (a), (b) and (c), with
focus on subsection (c)-Harms/Benefits Test).
186. See id. (addressing concern that Harms/Benefits Test would be improp-
erly applied and mitigation measures would not "adequately protect"
environment).
187. See id. at 878-79 (indicating relevant factors need to be examined without
considering how DEP and EQB previously considered factors).
188. See id. at 878 n.14 (noting legislature intended EHB to consider impact
of harms). The court highlighted as among the harms the possible drop in prop-
erty value offset by increased jobs, business and tax benefits. See id.
189. SeeEagle, 884 A.2d at 878 n.14 (stating EQB has duty to enact regulations
protecting natural resources from inappropriate solid waste practices).
190. See id. at 878-79 (indicating EQB required to establish "flexible and effec-
tive means to implement and enforce provisions" of SWMA and Act 101 through
balancing tests).
191. See id. at 879-80 (discussing whether grant of authority for Harms/Bene-
fits Test violated non-delegation doctrine).
192. See id. (noting legislature did not have specific rules on how to protect
environment and explaining that responsibility was left to EQB). The EQB is re-
sponsible for regulations dealing with specifics of landfills. See id. The EQB re-
ceived from legislative outline "necessary conditions" for conducting balancing
tests. See id.
193. See id. at 880 (specifying EQB has responsibility to protect "safety, health,
welfare and property of the public" and Commonwealth's natural resources from
"public health hazards, environmental pollution and economic loss").
2007]
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the regulation and the EQB's role. 194 If the court had failed to re-
examine the legislature's intent when developing the regulation,
there would be room to argue the court abused its discretion and
did not properly apply a plenary standard. 95
The court also applied a plenary standard of review in analyz-
ing the third issue. 196 Again, the court went back to the source and
re-evaluated its purpose before examining the specifics of the is-
sue. 197 The application of the standard differed in this issue be-
cause the analysis rested on general policy rather than information
in the record.198 The court relied on appellants' failure to uphold
their burden of demonstrating the test was wholly vague. 199 The
court did not stray from the plenary standard in re-affirming the
previous analysis. 200
Not surprisingly, in the fourth issue, the court again did not
fail to apply a plenary standard of review.20' The court cited the
burden of proof, noting the appellants failed to meet the requisite
burden. 20 2 Appellants did provide evidence to support their argu-
ment, but the evidence was not sufficient. 203 The court based its
analysis on the root meaning and purpose of the Harms/Benefits
Test, as it had earlier determined. 20 4 If the court had merely used
194. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 880-81 (referencing court's analysis focusing on
EQB's duty and authority).
195. See id. (considering different result if court did not follow appropriate
standards).
196. See id. at 881-82 (noting court's analysis of issue).
197. See id. at 881 (reviewing whether Harms/Benefits Test is unconstitution-
ally vague). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution and U.S. Supreme Court's standards for evaluating
vagueness. See id.
198. See id. at 882 (noting issue was very narrow regarding regulation in
question).
199. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 882 (stating appellants were unable to show vague-
ness of test in all applications). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted the bal-
ancing test is commonly used and terms easily understood. See id. With this
understanding, the court found there was no vagueness in the actual concept of
the test. See id.
200. See id. at 881-82 (highlighting court's holding on issue). Had the court
not re-evaluated legislative standards and proper analysis of regulation, the court
would err in its review. See id.
201. See id. at 882 (outlining standard of review facing court).
202. See id. (noting appellants had heavy burden). Police power affords the
Commonwealth authority over public health, morals and safety and will only be
overturned if unreasonable or arbitrary. See id.
203. See id. at 883 (supplying evidence that landfills needed to provide bene-
fits to environment). The court found an evaluation of harms and benefits was
necessary to evaluate if dangers would be highly outweighed. See id.
204. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 877-78 (referencing evaluation of Harms/Benefits
Test in light of regulatory authority).
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the lower court's definition of the meaning and purpose, it would
have erred in its analysis. 20 5
B. DEP Advantage on Appeal
A thorough analysis of Eagle and several other decisions ad-
vancing from the DEP through the EHB suggest there is a presump-
tion in favor of the EHB when it affirms a DEP decision. 20 6 For
instance, in Berks County, the EHB affirmed the DEP's modification
to a permit, and the commonwealth court agreed. 20 7 Also, in Mock
v. Department of Environmental Resources, the commonwealth court af-
firmed the EHB's decision to deny the petitioners' application to
construct an auto repair shop on their land.20 8 Further, the court
did not affirm only the DEP decisions striking down applications,
but also the decisions granting a permit.209 One example does ex-
205. See id. at 883 (postulating alternative outcome). The court conducted an
independent investigation. See id.
206. For a complete analysis of the DEP advantage on appeal, see infra notes
206-16 and accompanying text.
207. See Berks County v. Dep't of Envtl. Prof., 894 A.2d 183, 204 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2006) (holding that DEP's failure to complete harms/benefits analysis before tech-
nical review had no material effect on grant of permit application). The case in-
volved a landfill that, prior to the permit at issue, was authorized to accept specific
average daily volume. Id. at 185-86. When the landfill was almost up to capacity it
sought to increase the proposed disposal area. See id. The DEP issued a major
modification to the permit and approved an increase in height and average and
daily volumes and required the landfill to provide all of the benefits that it de-
scribed in its application. See id. at 206. The EHB held that the timing of the
technical review, which was completed prior to the harms/benefits analysis, was
within the DEP's province. See id. at 188.
208. See Mock v. Dep't. ofEnvtl. Res., 623 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993)
(holding that although petitioners might have been prevented from enjoying most
profitable use of their property, reduction in value was not enough to find taking).
The case concerned a landowner's application to fill wetlands on landowner's
property for the purpose of constructing an auto repair shop. See id. at 941-43.
The EHB upheld denial of petitioners' permit and the commonwealth court af-
firmed, holding that there was no unconstitutional taking. See id. at 943-45. The
court found that petitioners did not prove that their land was valueless after the
permit denial. See id.
209. See Butler Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 513 A.2d 508,
513-14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (holding respondent clearly committed to reasona-
ble efforts to minimize present and future environmental damage associated with
project). In Butler Township, the appellants, city and township board, challenged
an EHB decision that dismissed a challenge from an order of respondent Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources. See id. at 509-10. Respondent required appel-
lant township board and several surrounding municipalities and authorities to
enter into an agreement to provide for the construction of a regional sewage treat-
ment plant at a specific site within appellant township board's boundaries. See id.
at 511-12. Appellants argued that the environmental harm that would result from
the sewage treatment plant outweighed the benefits derived from the plant. See id.
2007]
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ist, however, where the EHB's decision was not affirmed, and the
higher court decided in favor of the DEP.2 10
The decision in Eagle remains consistent with the above obser-
vation.2 11 The EHB affirmed the DEP's decision of both Eagle and
Tri-County, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently
affirmed.2 1 2 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court employs a
plenary review, the above decisions are evidence of an obvious
trend. 213 Such a trend calls into question the review process of the
EHB, asking the appropriate question of whether review is even
necessary if the DEP's decision remains on appeal. Much like the
appeals discussed in the cases above, the instant appeal in Eagle has
a substantive basis.2 1 4 The continual affirmation of the DEP's deci-
sion suggests an appeal of procedural error seems to be a peti-
tioner's best option to overcome the DEP.2 1 5 If true, petitioners
face a heavy burden when appealing the DEP's decision.2 1 6
C. Harms/Benefits Test
The Harms/Benefits Test is utilized in this area of environ-
mental law to determine whether a specific project should be al-
210. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 819 A.2d 148, 153-54 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2003) (holding EHB erred in review of DEP's decision to grant peti-
tioners' permit modification application). The case concerned an increase in net
present value of host fees paid to the county and borough where faster payment of
host fees economically benefited the county and borough. See id. at 150-51. The
EHB suggested that the increase would not further the legislatively intended in-
centive to municipalities to host facilities, as any benefits would be cancelled out by
local costs and inconveniences. See id. at 151-52. The commonwealth court deter-
mined this proposition was not supported by substantial evidence. See id. at 153-54.
Thus, the DEP properly conducted the harms/benefits analysis, and there was no
evidence that the DEP abused its discretion in determining that the benefits from
the permit modification outweighed the harms. See id. Further, the landowners'
contention that the EHB erred in failing to rescind the permit modification on
procedural grounds was rejected because the DEP did not err by failing to enforce
any procedural requirements not in effect at the time of its action. See id. at 154.
211. See Eagle Envtl. II, L.P. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 884 A.2d 867, 872-75 (Pa.
2005) (giving overview of procedure).
212. See id. (discussing procedure).
213. For a complete analysis of plenary review, see supra notes 60-62 and ac-
companying text.
214. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 876 (discussing appeal of Harms/Benefits Test).
215. See id. (appealing Harms/Benefits Test); Berks County v. Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., 894 A.2d 183, 203-04 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (noting grounds for appeal);
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 819 A.2d 148, 153 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2003) (noting appeal of EHB decision successful but affirmation of DEP decision);
Mock v. Dep't. ofEnvtl. Res., 623 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (specifying
appeal); Butler Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 513 A.2d 508, 513-14 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986) (stating grounds for appeal). For a complete account of facts
and procedure of the above cases, see supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
216. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 876 (noting grounds for appeal).
26
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol18/iss1/6
WHO DECIDES THE STANDARD OF REVIEW?
lowed after weighing the possible benefits against the possible
harms and mitigation efforts.217 The DEP, the EHB and the courts
are left to weigh the social and economic considerations the appli-
cants present and to make an overall evaluation of the benefit or
detriment of a specific project. 218 The problem with such an evalu-
ation is the lack of set standards existing for the agency or court to
consider because traditionally decisions are viewed on a case-by-case
basis.2 19 This poses a problem because such decisions end up being
truly subjective and benefits are often construed in the eye of the
beholder.220 In other words, proper and effective social and eco-
nomic considerations in one case may not be applicable to the next
case.
221
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Leatherwood consid-
ered the harms and benefits of having a landfill near an airport.222
In accordance with the SWMA regulations, Leatherwood provided a
detailed analysis of potential impacts of the facility. 22 3 When the
EHB and the commonwealth court considered the application, the
most important factor was the potential for bird/aircraft colli-
sions. 224 Thus, the focus was on several experts' accounts and opin-
ions regarding the likelihood of collisions occurring as a result of
birds being attracted to the landfill. 225 The specificity of the evalua-
tion focused the EHB and the court on one major potential harm
and that was the basis of determining whether the landfill should
be permitted. 226
In Eagle, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not fo-
cus on a specific harm, like the bird/aircraft collision.2 27 As a re-
217. See id. at 871 (explaining considerations of Harms/Benefits Test).
218. See id. (discussing review method of DEP).
219. For a complete discussion of Harms/Benefits analysis, see supra notes 69-
94 and accompanying text.
220. For a complete comparison of different courts' interpretations of legiti-
mate harms and benefits, see supa notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
221. For a complete comparison of different courts' interpretations of legiti-
mate harms and benefits, see supra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
222. See Leatherwood, Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 819 A.2d 604, 607 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2003) (indicating that landfill would be less than 13,000 feet from
airport's runway which required demonstration that landfill would not pose bird
hazard to aircrafts).
223. See id. (maintaining environmental, social and economic benefits and
harms of proposed facility).
224. See id. (noting court's focus).
225. See id. (discussing public hearing, testimony from experts and industry
opinion).
226. See id. (noting focus of court and EHB).
227. See Eagle Envtl. II, L.P. v. Commonwealth, 884 A.2d 867, 871-72 (Pa. 2005)
(listing several harms and benefits flowing from project).
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suit, the EHB did not have a factor to focus on while making its
determination of the validity of the permit; rather, it had to make
an evaluation as a whole. 228 Although such an approach is not im-
proper, it can prove to be arbitrary because the significance of one
harm or one benefit may be entirely reflective of the specific views
of whoever is evaluating the standard. Additionally, so long as the
EHB does not abuse its discretion and its determination is not
outside the overall scope of social, economic and environmental
considerations, the decision will be affirmed. 229
In Eagle, the DEP permitted approval of the application be-
cause the benefits outweighed the harms.2 30 The DEP allowed the
permit because the harms were only potential while the benefits
were real. 23 ' This determination, though not invalid, is trouble-
some because the DEP decided real benefits outweighed potential
harms even though the magnitude of a potential harm could out-
weigh a real benefit.23 2 In Eagle, the potential harm of malfunction
of the leachate treatment plant could possibly have detrimental ef-
fects that would far outweigh the current real benefits. 233 Neverthe-
less, because this was only a potential harm and not a real harm, the
DEP decided it did not carry enough weight. 234 If, however, there
was a previous decision or standard noting the importance of
proper operation of the leachate treatment plant, the DEP would
give this potential harm greater consideration. 23 5 Thus, in the ab-
sence of clear standards, the reliance on a case-by-case analysis al-
lows for more arbitrary determinations of what weight should be
given to harms and benefits.23 6
On the other hand, there have been cases arising under the
EHB, Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court that supply factors to consider in applying the
Harms/Benefits Test to municipal and residual landfill opera-
228. See id. (evaluating all harms and benefits together).
229. See id. at 878 (citing Anela v. Pa. Hous. Fin. Agency, 690 A.2d 1157, 1159
(Pa. 1997) (detailing subsections with emphasis on Harms/Benefits Test).
230. See id. at 872 (noting that harms were only potentialities).
231. See id. (referencing reasoning of decision).
232. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 872 (citing potential harm of malfunction of
leachate treatment plant compared to real benefits of debris disposal and pay-
ments for specific programs).
233. See id. (addressing harms and mitigation efforts).
234. See id. (noting DEP's partial reliance on harms status as potential support
in decision).
235. See id. (speculating on change in DEP's decision).
236. See id. (considering effect of case-by-case analysis).
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tions.23 7 Even with these cases, it would be improbable to expect
every possible harm and benefit to have been considered previ-
ously.2 38 Thus, when there is a lack of precedent, the only way to
approach a matter is to take it on a case-by-case basis.2 39 Not doing
so and creating categories could allow for harms to go unnoticed
merely because they were not thought of in advance. 240
VI. IMPACT
The purpose of the Harms/Benefits Test is to act as a mecha-
nism where the DEP can balance the impact a project will have on
the environment and surrounding community to gain a greater un-
derstanding of the effect of a proposed project.24 1 Given the vary-
ing possibilities of particular harms and benefits in each
application, a definitive list of specific harms and benefits warrant-
ing an approval or disapproval of an application does not exist.24 2
Thus, the DEP considers social and economic conditions on a case-
by-case basis. 24 3
Although examining the social and economic considerations
on a case-by-case basis gives the DEP and courts leeway to examine
factors that had not been previously anticipated, it does not provide
applicants with any guidance as to what types of factors are war-
ranted.2 44 Although the legislature has not stated specific harms
will automatically warrant a denial, there is no bar set as to which
benefits are highly favored, leaving applicants unguided when sub-
mitting their application. 24 5
237. See Berks County v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 894 A.2d 183, 186-87 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2006) (outlining harms and benefits); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., 819 A.2d 148, 151-52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (applying Harms/Benefits anal-
ysis to municipal landfill).
238. See Berks County, 894 A.2d at 186-87 (listing harms and benefits); Brown-
ing-Ferris, 819 A.2d at 151-52 (dividing Harms/Benefits into landfill capacity, dispo-
sal space availability, miscellaneous community and economic benefits, odors,
other harms and host fees).
239. For a full discussion of the approach in Eagle, see supra notes 230-34 and
accompanying text.
240. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 887 (Newman, J. dissenting) (commenting on so-
cial and economic harms categories).
241. See Browning-Ferris, 819 A.2d at 154 (citing 25 PA. CODE § 271.127(c)
(2005)) (noting that to grant permit, benefits to public must outweigh, by mere
scintilla, any potential or known harms, so long as by requisite degree of certainty).
242. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 878 (suggesting strict standard not established).
243. See id. (suggesting strict standard not established).
244. For a complete analysis of factors, see supra notes 217-40 and accompany-
ing text.
245. See Paula Reed Ward, Trails to Trash - Landfill Proposal Displaces Recrea-
tional Plans in Centre County, Pa., PiTrSBURGH POST - GAzETTE, October 24, 2004, at
2007]
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The court's analysis of the harms and benefits in Eagle, for ex-
ample, placed considerable emphasis on the possible malfunction
of a leachate treatment plant.2 46 The emphasis placed on such a
distinct factor shows that applicants have no way to measure what
the DEP and courts will focus on and thus cannot tailor their appli-
cations accordingly. 247 The only possible gauge an applicant has
are previous applications submitted for similar permits. 248 But, as
each piece of land is different and as environmental priorities
change, even the most similar projects may not be sufficient to help
applicants. 249 Over time utilization of such a methodology presents
the danger of becoming an ad-hoc approach because no identifi-
able standards are established. 250
Further, the DEP and reviewing courts have the potential to
create an arbitrary standard, evaluating benefits and harms on a
case-by-case basis. 25 1 As discussed in Part V, the DEP and courts are
capable of placing varying weights on certain harms and benefits. 2 52
Without the knowledge of how specific harms and benefits will be
weighed, applicants are not aware of the proper burden of proof.253
Also, applicants have no guidance as to whether their benefits will
translate to the DEP as actual benefits outweighing the harms.2 54
Overall, the lack of such knowledge not only creates an uncertain
burden on applicants, but it gives the DEP an unfair advantage to
set the applicable standard arbitrarily.2 55 To avoid such an out-
come, the legislature and courts should come to a balance where
standards are defined but are not overly restrictive, because without
CI (noting if analysis was denied, developer could resubmit it later after address-
ing concerns listed by DEP).
246. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 872 (identifying harms and benefits to proposed
project and mitigation efforts for real and potential harms). The DEP, and subse-
quently, the court, determined the benefits exceeded the harms and granted the
permit. See id.
247. See id. (stating mitigation of potential harm satisfied).
248. See generally id. (speculating evaluation standard).
249. See generally id. (evaluating difficult task present when comparing two sep-
arate projects).
250. For a complete critique of the Harms/Benefits Test, see supra notes 217-
40 and accompanying text.
251. See id. at 877 (referencing broad standard).
252. For a complete discussion of consideration of harms and benefits by the
DEP and courts, see supra notes 69-94 and accompanying text.
253. See Eagle, 884 A.2d at 871 (specifying that each harm must have mitiga-
tion plan).
254. See id. at 871-72 (discussing balancing process).
255. See generally id. (considering applicants' knowledge).
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such guidance, the final decision lies truly in the hands of the initial
DEP decision-maker.
Meghan Flavin
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